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RECENT DECISIONS
In that case a conveyance of lots in the Sea Gate tract with ref-
erence to the field map, was under consideration. The Court said, 4
" * * * at the time this original grantee took title the defendant already
maintained a fence * * * and 'guard * * * and it enforced regulations
for admission through the entrance gate of only persons known to be
property owners or persons * * * having business with property
owners.' It must, therefore, have been clear to the grantee that his
grantor did not intend to grant him a right to use the street except
in the manner that a street in such a private residential colony would
be used."
The essential facts are the same as those provided here. The
decision is conclusive upon the right of the defendant to maintain a
fence to reasonably regulate admission to the community. The plain-
tiff is protected in all the rights to which it is entitled by this judg-
ment. Injunction properly denied.
REAL PROPERTY-LANDLORD AND TENANT-RETENTION OF
SECURITY AFTER EVICTIoN GOVERNED BY TEMs OF THE LEASE.-
Plaintiff's assignors deposited $6,000. with defendant Aaron as secur-
ity on a lease for ten years. The lease provided that the money
should be retained by the landlord until the expiration of the term
when it was 'to be returned with interest unless the tenants had
forfeited it by a violation of the covenants or conditions of the lease.
In the event that the landlord re-entered for breach by tenants of
these provisions, he was to have the right to terminate or relet as
tenants' agents. Thereafter the landlord, sold the premises and the
lease to defendant Mazer, transferring at the same time, the deposit,
upon the latter's agreement to indemnify him against any claim there-
for by the tenants. Subsequently, Mazer brought dispossess proceed-
ings against the tenants and obtained a final order in summary pro-
ceedings against them. Plaintiff thereupon brought this action to
recover the deposit upon the ground that the lease was terminated.
Held, for the defendant. The action was prematurely brought.
Rosenfeld v. Aaron, 248 N. Y. 437 (1928).
The conveyance of the property to Mazer did not terminate the
tenants' obligation under the lease.1 Where the deposit is not trans-
ferred to the grantee the security agreement is a mere collateral
covenant not running with the land.2 Here the grantee received the
deposit and agreed to indemnify the original landlord. The covenant
to return passed to the grantee subject to the terms of the lease.
Though no warrant to dispossess was issued 3 the removal of the
tenants after the issuance and service of the precept cancelled and
IIbid., 327.
'Kottler v. N. Y. Bargain House, 242 N. Y. 28, 150 N. E. 591 (1926).2 Fallert Brewing Co., Ltd. v. Blass, 119 A. D. 53, 103 N. Y. S. 865 (2nd
Dept. 1907).
' C. P. A., Sec. 1434.
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annulled the lease, unless by a proper survivorship clause the land-
lord reserved the option to keep it alive for the purpose of reletting
and holding the tenants for the deficiency.4 A mere provision that
in case of "re-entry" the lessor may so relet does not give him such
authority upon the recovery of possession by summary proceedings.6
Where, however, the parties by their contract give the word "re-
entry" a broader scope than its technical common-law definition,
such is not the case.6 Therefore, until the landlord by some affirma-
tive act terminates the lease, the action is premature.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-JURISDICTION-PERSONAL SERVICE
OUTSIDE OF STATE.-The vendee brought an action to compel specific
performance of an agreement to convey real property situated in
Westchester County, N. Y. The vendor, a resident of Connecticut,
was not served in New York, nor did he appear in the action but he
was personally served with a copy of the summons and verified com-
plaint in the State of Connecticut. The Supreme Court at Special
Term, issued an order directing the Sheriff to convey the property
to plaintiff as provided by statute. Defendant's motion to set aside
the service of the summons and complaint was denied.2 Upon
appeal he contended that the Court was without jurisdiction to make
the decree in question, since equity acts in personam merely, in the
absence of a statute enabling it to make a judgment in rem; that
there is no statute which authorizes personal service outside of the
State in an action for specific performance. Held, order affirmed.
The service was proper and sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction
to grant a judgment in rem, binding upon the non-resident. Garfein
v. Mclnnes, 248 N. Y. 261 (1928).
The language of the Civil Practice Act 3 is broad enough to
include an action for specific performance and service without the
State is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to render a judgment
in rem binding upon the non-resident so served. But a decree in
personam must be supported by actual service within the State.4
Consequently it is necessary to decide whether -the judgment is
directed solely against the defendant himself or whether it operates
directly upon the property resulting in a transfer of title to plaintiff.
That "equity acts in personam" is one of its oldest maxims and a
'Hoffman Brewing Co. v. Wuttge, 234 N. Y. 469, 138 N. F_. 411 (1923).
'Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N. Y. 381, 62 N. E. 425 (1902).6 Anzolone v. Paskusz, 96 A. D. 188, 89 N. Y. S. 203 (1st Dept. 1904),
herein approved.
1 C. P. A., Sec. 979.
2223 App. Div. 28, 227 N. Y. S. 585 (2nd Dept. 1928).
1C. P. A., Secs. 232, 235.
'Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151 (C. C. No. Dist. of Texas, 1884).
